周波：印巴空战是我国的又一个“DeepSeek时间”

发布时间：2025-05-21　点此：201次

编者按：近期，在印度与巴基斯坦空军交火中，巴基斯坦宣称其运用我国制作的歼-10战斗机击落了印度的阵风战机，事情引发世界社会广泛重视。清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波就此在《南华早报》宣布谈论文章，从国防工业的里程碑、世界军械商场的时机、解放军战略决心的提高，以及核武库扩大的必要性四个方面剖析了这一事情的战略意义。文章指出，这一事情不只展现了我国兵器体系的实战才能，也为我国在全球军事与地缘政治格式中赢得更大影响力供给了关键。北京对话与观察者网翻译发布中文，以飨读者。

【文/观察者网专栏作者周波，翻译/ 王凡非】

这是我国的又一个“DeepSeek时间”。到现在，全世界都已传闻巴基斯坦空军怎么运用我国制作的歼-10战斗机发射我国制作的PL-15导弹，击落了印度配备的最先进作战飞机——法国制作的阵风战斗机。

我国能从中罗致哪些启示？首要，这是我国国防工业的一个里程碑。这是我国最先进的兵器第一次真实有时机证明其可靠性和丧命威力。我国已有四十多年未卷进战役。开展是平和的最大盈利，我国在自给自足与立异方面的绵长堆集总算开花结果。

1991年的海湾战役对我国来说是一记警钟，美国主导的联军对伊拉克的进攻让我国看清了现代战役的作战方法，也让解放军认识到自己的缺乏。从前深受苏联体系影响的我国国防工业，现在已能自主研制高科技的顶级兵器。

据报导，我国在研制和测验轨迹轰炸体系方面处于领先地位，该体系运用低地球轨迹上的高超音速滑翔飞行器来打击目标。我国不是具有一款，而是两款第六代隐形战斗机，这是由两家不同我国公司研制的先进类型。

空战虽然发生在巴基斯坦与印度武装部队之间，但它也是我国与西方兵器体系之间初次比武的初步。

固然，歼-10战斗机的成功并不意味着它总能胜过法国阵风。两者均为4.5代战机，空战也是雷达体系与导弹制导的比赛。但歼-10乃至不是我国空军中最先进的战机——例如，还有第五代战机歼-20，相同由成都飞机公司制作，报导称其年产量高达100架。

巴基斯坦空军歼-10CE战机

其次，经巴基斯坦实战展现后，未来世界军械商场将由美国和我国两大供货商主导。美国在2020至2024年间占有43%的商场份额，未来几十年仍将是最大出口国，部分原因是盟友及某些同伴会根据政治考量而购买美国兵器。

我国在斯德哥尔摩世界平和研究所的排名中位列第四，占全球兵器出口的5.9%，落后于美国、法国和俄罗斯，曩昔首要出口坦克、火炮和小型兵器等低端产品。近三分之二的我国兵器出口流向巴基斯坦。但此次前所未有的“广告”后，我国各类精巧、高性价比的兵器将广受欢迎。

我国或许招引中东和北非的买家，如阿尔及利亚、埃及、伊拉克和苏丹，这些国家一般无法获取最顶级的西方技能。我国还或许在东南亚和拉丁美洲开拓商场。

正如俄乌抵触削弱了对俄制兵器的需求——比较战役迸发的2022年，上一年俄罗斯的兵器出口骤降了47%——印巴抵触也或许会削弱非美制西方兵器的招引力。一位俄罗斯学者曾告诉我，俄罗斯或许有一天会恳求我国向其出售兵器。对此，我并不感到意外。

第三，我国兵器体系在实战中的成功将增强解放军在潜在对立中的决心和战略地位。近年来，澳大利亚和加拿大等国派出飞机和军舰挨近我国滨海，应战我国的主权建议。即便这些寻衅仅具象征意义，现在也或许会削减。我国海军本年2月在澳大利亚海岸邻近进行实弹演习，已向澳大利亚传达了一个信息：解放军也能够以眼还眼。

我国海军军舰航迹图，材料来历：澳大利亚国防部

解放军在台湾海峡和南海的演习将愈加频频，科目演练更趋杂乱。这将迫使美国在任何军事干涉前深思熟虑。

正如最新的关税对立所显现的那样，我国是仅有有胆略和实力对立美国的国家。美国在台湾防卫问题上采纳的“战略含糊”方针，现在看起来更像是为美军无法在我国本乡赢得成功所讳饰的一块遮羞布。

第四，虽然我国在常规兵器方面发展敏捷，但仍应添加其核武库。鉴于印巴抵触是一场常规战役，这一定论或许出其不意。但是，正因为两国在核弹头数量上旗鼓相当——印度被以为具有172枚，巴基斯坦具有170枚——才促成了他们之间敏捷达到（虽然软弱的）停火。这种力量对比使两边都无法接受抵触晋级为核战役的价值。

五角大楼估量我国有600枚核弹头。美国的核弹头数量据信挨近我国的十倍。假如我国仅保持这一数量，莫非不会让美国在台海危机中胆大妄为到首要动用核兵器吗？究竟，一些美国智库现已提出过这种或许性。

我国从俄乌抵触中罗致的一个经验是，俄罗斯的核武库有用阻挠了北约直接介入抵触。对我国而言，技能才能和资金投入都不是首要问题，关键在于是否作出政治决议计划。具有更多核兵器并不会削弱我国“不首要运用”核方针，但在抵触不可避免时，这将为我国在家门口争夺成功供给更有力的保证。

（翻页检查英文原文）

This is another “DeepSeek moment” for China. By now, the world will have heard of how the Pakistan Air Force used Chinese-made J-10 fighter jets with Chinese-made PL-15 missiles to shoot down India’s French-made Rafale fighter jets, its best enlisted combat aircraft.

What lessons might Beijing draw? First, this is a milestone for China’s defence industry. Until now, China’s state-of-the-art weapons have had no real chance of proving their reliability or lethal power. China has not been at war in more than four decades. Development has been the largest dividend of peace and China’s long march of self-reliance and innovation is producing results.

The 1991 Gulf War was a wake-up call for China to modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The US-led coalition’s attack on Iraq showed China what a modern war looked like – and how inadequately prepared the PLA was. Chinese defence, heavily influenced in its early years by Russian systems, has now become a hi-tech modern force developing sophisticated weapons of its own.

China reportedly leads in developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system that uses a hypersonic glide vehicle on a low-Earth orbit to reach its target. It also reportedly has not one but two sixth-generation stealth fighters, advanced models that two different Chinese companies have come up with.

The aerial fight may have been between the armed forces of Pakistan and India, but it was also the first round of a duel between Chinese and Western weapon systems.

True, the reported success of the J-10 fighter jet does not necessarily mean it will always prevail over the French Rafale. Both are 4.5-generation aircraft and an aerial fight is also a contest between radar systems and missile guidance. But the J-10 is not even the best aircraft in China’s air force – for one, there is also the 5th-generation J-20, also manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Company, which is reportedly pushing them out at a rate of 100 a year.

Secondly, after the display in Pakistan, the international arms market will come to be dominated by just two suppliers: the US – and China. The United States, which commanded 43 per cent of the market from 2020-2024, will remain the biggest exporter for decades, in part because allies and some partners buy American arms for political reasons.

China, which came fourth on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute list with 5.9 per cent of global arms exports – after the US, France and Russia – used to sell low-end products such as tanks, artillery and small arms. Nearly two-thirds of China’s arms exports go to Pakistan. But after this unprecedented advertisement, Chinese arms of all types, with their sophistication and affordability, will become more popular.

China could be approached by buyers in the Middle East and North Africa such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Sudan, states that typically cannot access the most cutting-edge Western technology. It may also find markets in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

Just as the Ukraine war hurt demand for Russian weapons – exports plummeted by 47 per cent last year compared to 2022 when the war began – so the India-Pakistan conflict is likely to reduce the appeal of non-US weapons from the West. One Russian scholar told me Moscow may well ask Beijing to sell it arms one day; I was not really surprised.

Thirdly, the combat success of Chinese weapons systems will enhance the PLA’s confidence and strategic position in a potential showdown. In recent years, countries such as Australia and Canada have sent aircraft and ships near the Chinese coast to challenge China’s claims. Such provocations, even if merely symbolic, may now decrease. The Chinese navy’s live firing exercise off Australia’s coast in February told Canberra the PLA could do the same in return.

PLA exercises in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea will become more often and more sophisticated in rehearsing scenarios. It will make the US think twice about any military intervention.

As the latest tariff showdown demonstrates, China is the only county with the guts and heft to push back against the US.

Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” over the defence of Taiwan now seems more like a fig leaf fo a US military unable to guarantee a win on Chinese home turf.

Fourthly, China should increase its nuclear stockpile even if it is making swift advances in conventional weapons. This might be an unexpected conclusion given the India-Pakistan conflict is a conventional one. But their swift truce – if fragile – is also precisely because the two nuclear powers are evenly matched in terms of warheads: India is thought to have 172 to Pakistan’s 170, and neither can afford for their conflict to escalate into a nuclear war.

Should China maintain its nuclear arsenal of 600 warheads, as estimated by the Pentagon, might it not embolden the US, which is thought to have nearly 10 times as many warheads, to think about using nuclear bombs first in a Taiwan Strait crisis, as some American think tanks have suggested?

One lesson China has learned from the Ukraine war is that Russia’s nuclear stockpile deters Nato from directly involving the transatlantic security alliance in the conflict. For Beijing, neither technical know-how nor financial investment is a big problem. It is more a question of making a political decision. Having more nuclear weapons won’t compromise China’s no-first-use policy – but it would give China a better chance of a win at its doorstep should a conflict become inevitable.

告发/反应